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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH
11 & S CONSTRUCTION &
:D~NUTNEERING COMPANY
-vs-

'

Plaintiff,

CLEARFIELD STATE BANK,
Defendant,
VERN l\L SMITH, et al.,
Additional Defendants.

Case No.
10708

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff's action was for damages against the Bank
at Clearfield upon two grounds: (a) breach of agreernm t to extend financing assistance to the extent of
$50,000 on a continuing or revolving line of credit basis,
as required by plaintiff, to take care of payrolls and
op0rating costs pending receipt of payments from the
primp contractor on the basis of monthly estimates; and
( h) damages for improper appropriation by the Bank
of fund:-; belonging to plaintiff, received by the Bank in
1rni-;t subject to prior payment of all debts for labor and
li .. n:ihk obligations of plaintiff.
1

DI8POSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was submitted to the jury on the first cause
of action on special interrogatories (R. 87) as to (a)
whether such an agreement was made by the Bank;
and (b) whether the Bank breached the agreement. Both
interrogatories were answered by the jury in the affirmative.
Thereafter, the jury was requested to assess the
damages suffered by plaintiff on the basis of instructions
given by the Court as to the elements to be considered
in fixing damages for breach of contract. (R. 88-91).
The jury then rendered its verdict fixing plaintiff's damages in the sum of $156,000.00. (R. 95)
Issues pertaining to the second cause of action were
not submitted to the jury, but were reserved for determination by the Court as a matter of law on the basis
of the uncontradicted evidence; the Trial Court having
theretofore determined that the measure of damages
would be the same in the second cause of action as in the
first, since the result to plaintiff was the same, namely
forfeiture of its contract rights under the Steenberg
contract.
Thereafter, defendant Bank filed its motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (R. 97-99) which
was granted by the Trial Court upon two grounds: that
the contract for financing was unenforcable because it
was in violation of the Statute of Frauds, as one which
was not to he 1wrfonned within one year; and that the
fund represenkd hy the $38,862.54 check from Steenberg
2

was not received by the Bank in trust as a special deposit
or deposit for a special purpose, and hence that is was
available to the Bank for its appropriation and application as it saw fit. (R. 108-112).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the verdict of the jury reinstated and the final judgment entered thereon, or in
the alternative that the judgment be entered as a matter
of law on the second cause of action on the basis of the
uncontradicted evidence. Plaintiff and Additional Defendant Vern M. Smith seek to be relieved from affirmative judgments entered against them on several notes.
STATEMENT OF FAJCTS
Steenberg Construction Company had a general contract to construct the Lost Creek Dam for the Bureau
of Reclamation on the Weber Basin Project. Steenberg,
in turn, made a subcontract dated June 17, 1963, with
plaintiff M & S Construction Company for digging the
eore trench portion of the job (Exhibits A and I) with
the usual provisions for monthly payments to be made by
8teenberg to M & S on the basis of monthly estimates
as to value of labor performed and materials furnished,
remittance to be made to M & S by Steenberg from money
rt>eeived from the Bureau, less 10% to be retained by
St<>enberg until final completion of the subcontract.
1

Tlw subcontract also contained provisions requiring
~I & S to pay all costs of labor and materials as the same
3

became due and to save Steenberg harmless for all claims
and mechanics' liens on account thereof, and to furnish
~teenberg as and when reqiiested satisfactory evidence
tha·t i1I & S had complie.d with such payment obligation:-;.
The subcontract further provided that if M & S shall
default in performance of the contract, Steenberg shall
have the right to take over the job, have full access to
and use of all equipment in the care, custody and control
of M & S, and to take over and complete the contract
itself (see paragraphs I (a), V, XII, and paragraplu; 1
( d) of the agreement of the contractor on page 2 of
Exhibits A and I.)
ln general business practice such contracts call for
financial assistance by the contractor to carry payrolls
and obligations and to pay installment payments on
equipment and materials until the receipt of monthly
l'stimate pa)·uwnts ( T. 66, Sl, 82), particularly in the
c->arly stages of the job. ( T. 66, Sl, 82) M & S and its
principal stockholders were depositors with defendant
Bank so the Bank, through its Executive Vice President,
l\Ir. Jesse D. Barlow, solicited the business of furnishing
this financial sPrvice to M & S. (T. 23, 2-!) At first, M & ~
did not feel that it would need such assistance, because it
had practically completed two jobs, one at Dug·way
Proving Grnunds and another at Cedar Cit)r Airport,
from whid1 it was about to receive final payment; but
early in August, 19G3, 1\1 & S accepted the invitation of
Mr. Barlow for the Bank to furnish this assistance on
thP Bank's financial plan for a revolving or continuing
line of ('redit er. 80, 82, 113, 114). This arrangement was
('(msummatPd on or about August 2~, 1963. The limit of

nedit was first set at $25,000.00, and then raised to
$G0,000.00, to be utilized as needed, and effectuated by
tlw making and renewal of short-term notes to cover
payroll checks and other lienable expenditures, in accordanL'e with a pattern described by Mr. Barlow of the Bank,
and as found by the !Court and jury to be true as alleged
hy plaintiff (T. 87). Before making this agreement,
however, the Bank requested and received a copy of the
;\I & S contract with Steenberg, submitted the same to
it::; counsel, and discussed the merits of the agreement
with l\Ir. Walsh, Steenberg's vice president (T. 66).
To secure the defendant Bank against loss, the Bank
had its counsel prepare an assignment of all funds due
or to become due to M & S from Steenberg under the
subcontract, totaling an estimated $754,579.00, .a·s collateral security for all loans made and to be made by
tl1e Rallk to 1\1 & S, (see Exhibit B) which assignment
\\'as executed by .M & S, notarized by Mr. Barlow, and
t hell transmitted by the Bank to Steenberg for acceptnnee, which was done on August 23, 1963.
The defendant Bank thereafter, as additional securi t:<, also took similar assignments of all funds due
and to become due to M & S on the jobs at Cedar City
( $30,000.00), and at Dugway ($5,000.00) (T. 15, 17, 183),
in addition to chattel mortgages on the interest of M & S
in various equipment then owned or being purchased by
~I

&

~.

'l'h<' financing arrangement was performed according to agreement during September, 1963. Payroll checks
\\"I'(• dravYn and honored as presented, and short-term
5

loans were made and a note was renewed as agreed. The
September estimate for work done during August was
duly received Ly check made payable to the Bank and
M & S, with an endorsement on the back of the check to
be signed by both that all obligations for labor and materials had been paid (see the reverse side of Exhibit G)
and <luring this period l\I & S continued to issue its payroll checks to its employees which were duly honored by
the Bank. This was in accordance with the pattern established as a part of the financing agreement for the revob;ing or continuing credit between the Bank and M & S
as described by Mr. Barlow, with the understanding that
all such checks were to be countersigned by Mr. Claire
A. Niehmn, an accountant acceptable to the Bank. (T.
62, 63, 128).
The October payment from Steenberg for work done
during September, 1963, was delayed in arrival for reasons that arf' not material to this appeal, so the defendant
Bank, through its Executive Vice President, .Mr. Jesse
Barlow, personally undertook the job of obtaining the
money from Steenberg; made Jong distance phone calls
to Mr. Walsh of 8teenberg to find out why the delay, and
Mr. Walsh explained to him that the Government had not
transmitted funds as promptly as usual because of a
change in location of the accounting office (Exhibit H);
but finally, on October 23, 1963, a check for $38,862.54
from Steenberg, made payable to .M & S and the Bank,
arrived, with an endorsement on the reverse side to be
signed by both M & S and Mr. Barlow for the Bank, as
set forth nrhatirn i11 011r discussio11 under Point II. This
check was accompanied by a lettPr of transmittal signed
(j

liy Steenberg addressed to the defendant Bank, also

Rct forth verbatim in our discussion of Point IL

In the meantime, these payroll checks on the Lost
Creek job had been given to laborers in accordance with
the Agreement, and the same had been permitted to aceumnlate in the Bank. (T.128).

The letter of transmittal from Steenberg, with the
check, arrived at the post office at Clearfield, Utah, in
the evening, after the close of business, but Mr. Barlow,
not content to wait until the morrow, got the postmaster
to go down to the post office to get it out, called Mr.
Mendenhall of M & S to come over and endorse the check,
arnl then had an officer of an Ogden bank, its correspondent, put its stamp on the check following an endorsement by Mr. Mendenhall of M & S and the endorsement
hy defendant Bank; and then the Ogden bank officer
personally took the check to the airport in Salt Lake
that same night for mailing to St. Paul, Minn., for payment. It was during this time, while the Bank was waiting
for the check to clear that M & S became fearful that the
Hauk might not honor its financing agreement, so it had
its attorney, Mr. Pritchett, call on Mr. Barlow at the
Bank to urge the Bank to adhere to its financing agreement. (T. 89, 90) Mr. Barlow requested Mr. Pritchett
not to communicate to Steenberg any intimation of trouble
lwtwePn the Bank and M & S until after the check had
<·]pared. Then, ·when Mr. Barlow had been advised personally by Mr. Walsh of Steenberg over long distance
phone that the check had cleared, he called Mr. Stoker
of T\l & S into the Bank and then for the first and final

7

time directed that all payroll ehecks of M & S on the Lost
Creek job were to be dishonored, payment refused, (T.
127, 131), and directed that the amount of the check be
credited to ohligatio11s of 11 & S to the Bank and its officers exeepting only a small amount, one of which obligations so paid was not yet due, including also a $2,000.00
note owned by .Mr. Barlow and Mr. Steed personally, and
one note subject to the renewal agreement.
The result was of course that Steenberg immediately
defaulted M & S on the job, made arrangements to pick
up the outstanding payroll checks, took over all equipment, and M & S lost not only its investment in the job
amounting to $100,129.91 (Exhibit N), but also its anticipated profit; all as found by the verdict of the jury to be
in the sum of $156,000.00. (T. 129, 134)
The jury found for 1.1 & S on all issues on the basis
of the Trial Court's instructions as to the issues on the
first cause of action and as to the measure of damages.
The rrrial Court then, upon motion of the defendant
bank, considered the Bank's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was thereafter granted
on July 12, 1%6 upo11 the following grounds:

1. That the financing contract for revolving credit
lJetween 1\[ & S and the Hank was invalid because it was
barred by the Statute of Frauds as contemplating action
not to be p<~rforrnPd ·within one year; and
2. That the evidence did not show that the deposit
of $38,8()2.54 rpceiv<~d by the Bank from Steenberg on
October :23, 1Uii:3, \\'a~ received in trust as a deposit for
8

special purpose, namely to pay for labor and materials
on the job; and hence was available to the Bank for its
appropriation.
This appeal is from the order and judgment of the
Trial Court in making and entering that judgment notwi t hstaucling the verdict of the jury.
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE AGREEMENT UPON WHICH APPELLANT
BASED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND WHICH
AGREEMENT WAS FOUND BY THE JURY IN
ANSWER TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORY TO HAVE
EXISTED IN FACT, WAS BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF 25-5-4 (1) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, IN THAT SAID AGREEMENT BY ITS TERMS
WAS NOT TO BE PERFORMED WITHIN ONE YEAR
FROM THE MAKING THEREOF.

During the course of this lawsuit there has been
mention of several contracts, subcontracts and agreements. \;Ve are presently concerned with one and only
one of these, namely the Bank's agreement to finance
M & S on the Lost Creek Dam Project, as alleged in
appellant's second cause of action. There is no question
as to whether or not such Agreement did in fact exist
for such was resolved in the affirmative by the jury's
answer to Special Interrogatories. The question remains
to be resolved by this Court as to whether or not such
Agreement is enforcible under the provisions of the
lTtah Statute of Frauds found at 25-5-4 (1) Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, which reads as follows:
In the following cases every agreement shall
be void unless such agreement or some note or
9

memorandum thereof is in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is
not to be performed within one year
from the making thereof.

(2)
(3)

*****

(4) *****
(5) *****

The nature of the Agreement was such that the
Bank agreed and promised to lend to M & S, as and
when required by M & S, for the pUirpose of providing
finances to carry on its work under the terms and provisions of the subcontract between M & S and Steenherg Construction Company, certain sums of money and
to renew such loans from time to time to the date of
final payment by Steenberg Construction Company (T.
87). M & S contfmds that there is nothing within the
terms of the subcontract referred to which by the terms
thereof negate the possibility of performance within one
year from the making of the agreement to loan money.
Such factor is extremely significant as will appear from
an analysis of the authorities on this subject.
In discnsHing this point of law 2 Corbin on Contracts
534 states at Section 444:

... In its actual application ... the courts have
perhaps even less friendly to this provision
than to the other provisions of the Statute. They
have obSPfVPd the Pxaet words on this provision
and haw inkrpreted thPm literally and very narro\\'l~v .... In gprn•ral the easPs in<licate that there
bf~Em

lO

must not be the slightest possibility that it (the
Agreement) can be fully performed within one
year.
It makes no difference how long the agreed
ma! be delayed, or over how long
a period it may m fact be continued. It makes no
difference how long the parties expect the performance to take or how reasonable and accurate
those expectations are, if the agreed performance
can possibly be completed within a year. Facts
like these do not bring a contract within the
StatUJte. A provision in the contract fixing a
maximum period within which performance is
to be completed, even though that period is much
in excess of one year, does not make the Statute
applicable. A building contract is frequently such
that it can be fully performed within one year. If
so, it is not within the one year clause however
long the parties may expect to take or actually
do take.
perfo~ma!1ce

In the subcontract ref erred to above there was a
fixed time limit within which such contract had to be
performed, however, there was no provision which in
any way could have been construed to negate the possihility of performance within one year.
Iu Granvold v. Whaley, 39 Wash. 2d 710, 237 P.2d

1026, the Supreme Court of Washington held that where
a performance of a certain agreement was not possible
until a certain dam was completed, that the fact that the
da1n could have been completed within one year, but
wa:,; not expected to be and was not in fact completed for
thn•e years, did not place the agreement within the purvie1v of the Statute. In reaching this conclusion, the
11

Court referred to 2 Corbin on Contracts 541, Section
445 as follows:
A certain performance that would not in
itself take a year to complete may be promised
at a definite future date more than one year from
the time of making the Contract. Such a Contract
is within the Statute. But if such a performance
is promised at an uncertain time to be determined by the happening of a condition that may
possibly occur within one year, the promise cannot be said to be one that is not to be perfonned
within one year and it is not within the one year
clause of the Statute. It makes no difference how
improbable it is that the condition will occur within a year; if there is any possibility that it may
so happen, the statutory provision is not applicable. Nor does it make any difference that the
condition is one that may never happen at all.

i-.

A like result was reached in M cClanahan
OttoM armet Co., 74 W. Va. 543, 82 S.E. 752 wherein the
Court held that a contract to cut the timber on certain
tracts of land and deliver it as ties and posts was not
within the Statute, evr11 though the employee expected
when he undertook the vv·ork that it would require six
years to complete. The court said: "It can only be said
that it was not likely to be performed, nor expected by
plaintiff to be performed within a year. This \\·as held
in Kimmins 1'. Oldhum, 27 W. Va. 259, not to bring an
agreement within the Statute."

The Supreme Court of the United States considered
this section of the Statute of Frauds in the leading case
of Warner r. '/'r;ros and J>acific R. Co., 164 U.S. 418, 41
L.Ed. 495, J7 S. Ct. H 7. I 11 m1 <·xha usfo·e opinio11, the

12

Court ::>ta ted that "the question is not what the probable or expected or actual performance of the contra.ct
was, hnt whether the contract according to the reasonable
i11terpreta tion of its terms required that it should not be
performed tcithin a year." (Emphasis added). As stated
aboYe, there is no indication that performance by the parties "·as required not to be performed within one year.
;3 \Villiston on Contracts, 3rd Ed. 575 is in accord with
thP views expressed above and states at Section 495:

It is well settled that oral contracts invalidated by the Statute because not to be performed
within a year include those only which cannot be
performed within that period.
'l'he interpretation of this provision of the Statute
of Fra mls is summed up in 49 Am. J ur. 383, Statute of
Frnuds, Rection 23 wherein it is stated that "to bring a
1·aHe \Yithin the Statute there must be a negation of the
ri.r7ld to 1;erform within one yea.r." "In other words, that
<l contract cannot be performed within a year means not
a natural or physical impossibility, but an impossibility
by th<' terms of the contract itself . . . " (Emphasis
added)
The foregoing has been intended as a general surw·y of the law on this subject, which survey supports
the proposition that enforcement of the Agreement
fnnnd hy the jury is not barred by the Statute of Frauds,
in tliat there was nothing in the terms of said AgreetnPnt or within the terms of the subcontract upon which
s1wh Agreement is in part dependent, which in any way
lwgat<' the possibility of performance or the right to

13

perform within 01w yPar. ln the absence of such restrirtion within the terms of the Agreement or Subcontract, the Statute is not applicable and the enforcement thereof must not be hampered by the Statute.
The Rupreme Court of Utah, chose to place itself
within the main stream of judicial thought on this point
in Zion's Service Corporation v. Danielson, 12 U. 2d
369, 366 P.2d 982, wherein the 1Court stated at column
1, page 985:
"vVhere the agreement can be performed
within one year, though this be done by election
of one of the pnrties to terminate, there can be no
doubt but that the Statute of Frauds is not applicable. We agree with the following statement
from the RPstatement of Contracts and believe
it determinative of this question:
'The words "cannot be fully performed"
must be taken literally. The fact that perfonnance within a year is entirely improbable or not expected by the parties,
does not bring the contract within this
Statntt>.' (Rec. 198, Comment b.)
"ln Johnson V8. Johnson, 31 Utah -108, 88 P.
230, we ruled that a contract by a purchaser of
land to pay the sdler 'for life, one-half of the
rrops produced on the lands' was not within the
ahovP provision since death might occur within
one yPar. The right to terminate a contract at any
tinie. is likewise such an event as may occur within
a. year and hrnce the statide does not apply."
(All t>rnphasis added.)
The position that the Bank urged upon the trial
court has hePn <'learl,v rPjPct<>d b>T this Court in a rrcent
14

decision involving an identical financial arrangement
and an identical factual situation to the case at bar. This
Court has clearly held that under these circumstances
the 8tatute of Frauds provision as to performance withm one year is not applicable.

In that case, Commercial Security Book v. Hodson,
15 U.2d 388, 393 P.2d 482, this Court stated:
"The exact length of time that this loan
should last is not specified, but there is nothing
in the evidence which indicates that the loan
should not terminate in less than a year."
In the case before the Court it was not stated exactly
how long the revolving credit agreement would last, except that the loans would be made as and when required
by 1\1 & S to date of final payment from Steenberg.

It is significant to note that pursuant to the terms
of the Agreement loans were to be made "as and when
l'P< iuired" by M & S and under such arrangement the
Agreement could have been terminated at any time by
M & S upon finding that it had no need for further loans.
It is not uncommon for construction companies to require financing during the initial stages of a contract
and then become able to function without financing during the final stages of construction when the heavy and
<>xpensive work has been completed. ('I'. 66, 82, 114)
l~nd<'l' these circumstances and in light of this 1Court's
holding in Zion's Service Corporation v. DO!tlielsori,
:,;upra, and Commercial Secitrity Bank v. Hodson, supra,
t lie Statute of Frauds is not applicable here since M & S
<'0111<1 have terminated the Agreement at any time within
one year.

15

As previously stated, there is nothing in the evidence, Agreement or Subcontract which precludes the
possibility of performance and hence, the final payment
from Steenberg all within one year and although performance within that time may have been deemed improbable, such was not sufficient reason to bring the
transaction within the purview of the Statute.
In view of the facts as disclosed by the record and
the eminent authorities cited herein, the District Court
erred in applying the Statute of Frauds in such a manner
as to preclude the enforcement of the Agreement found
by the jury to have existed as alleged in appellant's
second cause of action.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, THE $38,852.54 CHECK WAS
SUBJECT TO SET OFF AND APPROPRIATION BY
THE BANK. THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE
SHOWED IT TO BE HELD BY THE BANK IN
TRUST AS A SPECIAL DEPOSIT ON DEPOSIT FOR
SPECIAL PURPOSES, OF WHICH THE BANK HAD
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE. THE JUDGMENT SHOULD
HA VE BEEN ENTERED FOR M & S ON THIS BASIS,
REGARDLESS OF THE RESULT AS TO THE FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION.

Thf• facts with reference to this phase of the case are
relativPly simple, almost entirely in writing, and leave no
doubt as to tlw liability of thP Bank for the natural results of its ~J'tl..et-. a:t-.1Puc.T,
The assignmPnt (Exhibit B) by which defendant acquired its right to r<'rt>ivt> these monthly payments, clear-

ly and plainly states the relationship of the Bank to the

fund, viz: as the agent of M & S , with autlwrity to endorse the checks on their behalf; and that it (the Bank)
receives the same as collateral security for loans made
and t.o be nwde by the Bwnk to M & Sand as collateral
security for any and all liabilities due or to become due
from M & S to the Bank.
Payment for the September estimate was made by
check dated October 22, 1963, and received by the Bank
under the circumstances in the most unusual manner
described in the statement of facts. The letter of transmittal from Steenberg and the endorsement on the check
to be signed by the Bank and M & S are as follows:
"October 22, 1963
AIH MAIL-SPECIAL DELIVERY
Clearfield State Bank
Clearfield, Utah
Attn: "Mr. Jesse Barlow, Executive Vice President
Re: M & S Construction & Engineering Co.
Lost Creek Dam, Weber Basin Project
Ftah, Spec. No. DC-5935
0Pntlernen :
In line with our conversation of this date, we are
(•nelm;ing herewith our check in the amount of $38,862.54
in pa,nuent of the September Estimate due Th~ & S Con~trndion & F_Jngineering Co. on the above proJect.

Tnasrnuch as we will have to depend upon one an-

lltlwr on this dt>al, we are looking to you to ascertain from
l\f r. Claire Nielson, Auditor for M & S, that these fun~s
nrP heing used to keep their accounts current on this

prnjP<'L
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We greatly appn~ciah; your help on keeping us advised with any new information or developments around
our sub-contractor, M & S, and we ask that you keep any
convenmtions or <·orrcspond('nce confidential on this matter.
With kindest penional rl:'gards,
Sincerl:'ly,

STEI!JNBJ<JRG ·CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY

By /s/ Emil E. Walsh
Emil I~. ·walsh, Vice President
EEvV/het
enclosure-check"
Endorsement on check:
"ln consideration of this check and the endorsement thereof, we hereby certify that we
have paid all labor, material, equipment, etc., used
on the Weber Ba:;;in Project, and do hereby waive
all rights to assert claims against Steenberg Construction Co., its sur·l:'ty and the owner up to and
including Sep. 19G3, except for the retained percentagc->, if any, as sPt forth in our contract."

M & S Const. Engr. Co.
By /s/ James H. Mendenhall
Vice-President & Treasurer
Clearfield State Bank
By /s/ Jesse D. Barlow
Exect. V. P.
(jl<>arfi<·<l Ntate Bank
Cl(·arfiP1<1, l Hah
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Under these undisputed facts, regardless of whether
there was or was not an agreement with the Bank to
extend to M & S this revolving or continuing line of
credit under the pattern described by Mr. Barlow (R.
221, 222) the Bank never had such a relationship to the
proceeds of this $38,862.54 check as to give it (the Bank)
the right to appropriate it to the payment of its obligations and to payment of notes held by its officers when it
then had in its possession payroll checks issued by M & S
as ref erred to in the letter and endorsement; and with
the full knowledge of the fact that by so doing it would
not only violate the trust relationship as to the fund set
forth in the letter and on the check itself, but also would
cause an irreparable breach in the Steenberg contract
with M & S, and give Steenberg the right to declare default and take over the job.
In the first place, neither the Bank nor M & S, under

the Steenberg contract, had the right to demand or receive the fund, unless payrolls had been paid and lienable obligations discharged. The Bank, as assignee of
the fund, had no better right to the money than M & S.
The Steenberg contract expressly so states. It even goes
further, and gives Steenberg the right to demand proof
of such fact before payment is made, which is exactly
what it did. The requirements set forth in the Steenberg
letter (Exhibit I), and on the reverse side of both checks
( I~xhibits G and H) were within the contract right of
8 t<·en berg.
Tho fund belonged to M & S, subject only to the
prior right of Steenberg to require proof of payment of

19

payrolls and prior application as above set forth; and
subject also to the right of the Bank, as agent of M & S
to receive it and hold for M & S as collateral security
for loans made and to be nia<de.
From these undisputed facts, the law clearly imposes
upon this fund the status of a trust relationship, a special
deposit or a deposit for a special purpose, well-known in
the law, not a general one which may be subject to offset or appropriation by the Bank. It surely requires no
citation of authorities to this Court to establish the fact
that funds received as agent and held as collateral, as
recited in the assignment itself are received and held under a trust relationship as to those funds, regardless of
what other relationship may exist between the parties
as to other funds. But the letter transmitting the fund
and the endorsement on tlw reverse side of the check
leave no doubt as to its being a special deposit, or deposit
for a ;:.;pecial purpose relationship between the parties
as to this particular fund.
A bank has the right of appropriation and set-off as
to funds held in a gt•neral account where the relationship
is that of debtor and creditor-not that of trustee and
cPstui que trust.
rt1 his would b1~ true regardless of the presence or absence of the continuing or revolving line of credit agreement. Jt would lw doubly true if, as stated in the assignment itself, thP Cunds to be n·ceived under the assignment
arP to lw n•t·Piwd hy the Bank as agent and held as collateral for loans lo lie made in the future, as clearly set
forth in the assigmt11·nt and, as established by the evi20

dPnt·e, to consist of a continuing relationship as needed
under the subcontract with Steenberg.
The authorities are overwhehningly and almost uniformly against the right of the Bank to do what it did in
disregarding and violating its agreement with M & S, and
in appropriating to itself funds entrusted to it under this
condition of trust. The Bank had the right to refuse to
receive the deposit under the conditions imposed by the
m;signment as drawn by its own counsel, and as imposed
under the terms of the letter of transmittal and under
the terms of the endorsement which it was required to
aeeept, but it had no right whatsoever to receive the deposit under those conditions and then, under highly questionable conduct1 take the money, and leave M & S and
~teenberg to pick up the wreck.
The fact that a part of the money was applied on a
note that wasn't even due, part of it applied to payment
of noh!8 held by l\Ir. Barlow and Mr. Steed personally,
and a large part on the payment of a note that was agreed
to he renewed under the revolving line of credit agreelllPnt, simply paints the picture in the true colors as to
how far some people are willing to go in violating their
word and in breaching a relationship of trust and confi(lern'P.
Nor can they be heard to say that they did not know
01· folly appreciate the dire consequences of their conduct.
'l'lwi r eounsel had studied the Steenberg contract, and
11a:,.; present at the final decision to dishonor the checks,
and the Bank was fully informed as to what would occur
if they did as they said. The Bank had drawn the assign-
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ments and chattel rnortgagt>s under which the Bank had
gathered in every vestige of resources M & S had. M & S
had nothing else to offer to any other financing agency.
When they dishonored those payroll checks, they pulled
tho whole structure down and the jury was most considerate in assessing the damages as low as it did.
\Ve submit the following authorities that deny the
right of the bank to do that :
7 Am .•J ur. 298, Banks, Sec. 424 - "Deposits for
Special Purposes - Deposits of funds for a speeial purpose, such as for the purpose of paying
such funds to a third perion upon the presentation
of certain papers or instruments of title; paying
hands or the interest thereon as such obligation
matures; paying a mortgage indebtedness; meeting certain checks or classes of checks; taking up
the depositor's note that has been indorsed to another bank; transmitting such funds to another
at a distant place; paying a contractor for work
being performed by him; holding such money in
escrow, to be returned to the vendee if title is found
defective, and to bt> paid to the vendor if title is
approved; furnishing collateral security to the
bank, etc., have all the attributes of special dt>posits and are gt>ncrally termed and constructed
as such. 1-'lw bank becomes a bailee of the deposit,
as in tlH~ ordinary case of a special deposit, in so
far as the rett>ntion of the deposit is concerned;
beyond such function, and in addition thereto, the
hank has also the fiduciary duty of an agent to
apply the deposit to the particular purpose for
which it was delivered to the bank, and in case of
the misapplication of the deposit, it may be followed on tlw trnst fund theory."
I'. flq)(frtment, 210 Ind. 83, 199 N.E.
/lfi. ReP anuotntion 105 A.L.R. 516.

Fi'i11dli11per

Where there is a deposit in a bank for the purpose
of meeting certain checks or classes of checks, it is genPrally held that the money thus deposited must be applied to the purpose for which it was deposited. It cannot
be diverted by the bank therefrom. Morton v. Woolery
48 N.D. 1132, 189 N.W. 232. Seen annotation 24 A.L.R.
1111; Payne v. Burnett, 151 Tn. 496, 269 S.W. 27. See
annotation 39 A.L.R. 1138; Re Warren's Bank, 209 Wis.
121, 244 N.W. 594, 86 A.L.R. 371. See annotation at
page 375.

Zions Savings Bank v. Rouse, 86 Ut. 574, 47 P.2d 617:
''The right of a bank to apply a depositor's funds,
held by it, to payment of his indebtedness, can
exist only where each occupies the position of
debtor and creditor, and where there exists mutual
demands. 5 Michie, Banks and Banking, 218. The
debt owing by the depositor must have matured.
5 Michie, Banks and Banking, 216. Both maturity
and mutuality are essential to the validity of a
setoff."
The relationship of debtor and creditor is entirely
different from the trust relationship existing here as to
tlu-• nature of the fund as a deposit for a special purpose
and also as to its status as collateral under the assignnwnt.
'l'he doctrine was reaffirmed by our Supreme Court
in Seaboard Finance v. Shire, 117 Ut. 546, 218 P.2d 282.
The most recent consideration of the subject is conta iiwd in National Indemnity Co. v. Spring Branch State
flank, 162 Tex. 521, 348 S.W. 2d 528; as annotated in 8
23

A.L.R. :1rd 229, ~with thP following heading listing cases
from almost every state in the Union at p. 339:
"It has universally been held that knowledgP
upon the part of a hank that deposits made by a
dl'lltor in his own na11w belong to a third person
absolutely precludPs the hank from applying such
funds to the individual indebtedness of the depositor to it."

See also Moore Jlill & Lumber Co. v. Cnrry Cou1Ytty
Bank, 200 Ore. 558, 267 P.2d 202, quoting with approval 9
C .•J .S., Banks and Banking, Sec. 275, page 570, as follows:

"* * * A specific deposit, or deposit for a
specific purpose, consists in the delivery of money
or property to a bank for application to a designated object or a defined purpose, as in the case
of money deposited to meet a maturing obligation
or a note delivered for collection. While such a
deposit has hPen referred to as 'special,' and by
other authority has been termed general in charaeter, strictly speaking it is neither general nor
wholly spPcial, but constitutes a distinct class of
deposits.

"A 'specific' de1Josit partakes of tlw nature of
a 'special' deposit to the extent that title to thP
thing derlOsited remains in the depositor and does
not })ass to the bank, unless and until applied to
the speeifiPd purpose, that no relation of debt?r
and creditor is created between bank and depositor, and that the hank becomes the depositor's
agent, hailPP, or trusteP. * * *"
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ENTERED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE BANK ON ITS COUNTERCLAIMS AND CROSS COMPLAINT WHEN THE
EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE NOTES WERE
SECURED AND THE BANK HAD DESTROYED ITS
SECURITY IN AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF THE
AMOUNT OF THE NOTES.

Additional defendant Y ern l\I. Smith has appealed,
along ~with Plaintiff, from the judgment entered by the
Court in the first and second causes of action of its
<'OUnkrclaims, and against plaintiff on its third and
fourth causes of action; and against additional defendant
Vern M. Smith on its first cause of action in its cross
<·0111vlaint.
Tiw uncontradicted evidence shows that these alleged
cansl'S of action were secured by the assignment, Exhibit
.. B," and that pursuant to that assignment defendant held
a:o :c:ecurity all of the right of plaintiff to receive from
~tP<:>nherg payment for its October, 1963 estimate, plus
tht> 10% retained on prior estimates, plus the additional
claim for additional work on the core trench, in addition
to its estimated profits on the job, all as referred to by
:.Ir. Pritchett (R. 87). This security was placed by the
assigm1wnt in the name of the Bank to be held by it as
<'ollateral s<:>curity, and it had the exclusive right to have
an<l n~ceive the same. It stands before this Court as
l1aving Pither intentionally or negligently destroyed that
c:(•<·nrity by its improper action.
'rhP jury found the lost security to have been worth
$1 :J(),0()0 for loss of profits alone. The defendant was not
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entitled to recover a personal judgment against any of
the parties on this phase of the record regardless of either
of the other questions presented.
A pledgee of property or property rights, to be held
as collateral security must use reasonable care to protect
the property or property right pledged and is liable for
either intentional or negligent loss or damage to the security. See 41 Am. Jur. 619, Sec. 49 of Pledge and Collateral Security and Restatement of the Law, "Security,"
Sec. 17, as to duty of pledgee with reference to pledged
security. See note on liability of Bank for loss or damage
to pledgee 's property. 68 A.L.R. 2d, 1262, Sec. 4; 72
C.J.S. 5, Sec. 2, under "Pledges."
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CONCLUSION
The jury was right in its verdict; the Trial Judge
erroneously granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and erroneously granted judgment
to defendant Bank on the counterclaim and cross complaint for amounts represented by notes secured by the
assignment of funds to be received from Steenberg.
Respectfully submitted,
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